Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and Related Animals

BACKGROUND: The issue of whether other animals have internally felt experiences has vexed animal behavioral science since its inception. Although most investigators remain agnostic on such contentious issues, there is now abundant experimental evidence indicating that all mammals have negatively and positively-valenced emotional networks concentrated in homologous brain regions that mediate affective experiences when animals are emotionally aroused. That is what the neuroscientific evidence indicates. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The relevant lines of evidence are as follows: 1) It is easy to elicit powerful unconditioned emotional responses using localized electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB); these effects are concentrated in ancient subcortical brain regions. Seven types of emotional arousals have been described; using a special capitalized nomenclature for such primary process emotional systems, they are SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY. 2) These brain circuits are situated in homologous subcortical brain regions in all vertebrates tested. Thus, if one activates FEAR arousal circuits in rats, cats or primates, all exhibit similar fear responses. 3) All primary-process emotional-instinctual urges, even ones as complex as social PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-decortication early in life; thus, the neocortex is not essential for the generation of primary-process emotionality. 4) Using diverse measures, one can demonstrate that animals like and dislike ESB of brain regions that evoke unconditioned instinctual emotional behaviors: Such ESBs can serve as 'rewards' and 'punishments' in diverse approach and escape/avoidance learning tasks. 5) Comparable ESB of human brains yield comparable affective experiences. Thus, robust evidence indicates that raw primary-process (i.e., instinctual, unconditioned) emotional behaviors and feelings emanate from homologous brain functions in all mammals (see Appendix S1), which are regulated by higher brain regions. Such findings suggest nested-hierarchies of BrainMind affective processing, with primal emotional functions being foundational for secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, which interface with tertiary-process cognitive-thoughtful functions of the BrainMind

The affective core of the self: A neuro-archetypical perspective on the foundations of human (and animal) subjectivity

Psychologists usually considered the "Self" as an object of experience appearing when the individual perceives its existence within the conscious field. In accordance with such a view, the self-representing capacity of the human mind has been related to corticolimbic learning processes taking place within individual development. On the other hand, Carl Gustav Jung considered the Self as the core of our personality, in its conscious and unconscious aspects, as well as in its actual and potential forms. According to Jung, the Self originates from an inborn dynamic structure integrating the essential drives of our "brain-mind," and leading both to instinctual behavioral actions and to archetypal psychological experiences. Interestingly, recent neuroethological studies indicate that our subjective identity rests on ancient neuropsychic processes that humans share with other animals as part of their inborn constitutional repertoire. Indeed, brain activity within subcortical midline structures (SCMSs) is intrinsically related to the emergence of prototypical affective states, that not only influence our behavior in a flexible way, but alter our conscious field, giving rise to specific feelings or moods, which constitute the first form of self-orientation in the world. Moreover, such affective dynamics play a central role in the organization of individual personality and in the evolution of all other (more sophisticated) psychological functions. Therefore, on the base of the convergence between contemporary cutting-edge scientific research and some psychological intuitions of Jung, we intend here to explore the first neuroevolutional layer of human mind, that we call the affective core of the Self

Studying the Evolutionary Basis of Emotions Through Adaptive Neuroagents: Preliminary Settings and Results

We propose a method to investigate the adaptive and evolutionary function of emotions and affective states, in our case of ancestral fear - using Artificial Life and Evolutionary Robotics techniques. For this purpose, we developed a hybrid software-hardware capable to train artificial neuroagents equipped with a sensory-motor apparatus inspired on the iCub humanoid robot features. We trained populations of these agents throughout a genetic algorithm to perform a well-known neuropsychological task adapted to study emotional phenomena. The robots learnt to discriminate stressful emotional conditions (coping with “dangerous” stimuli) and no-stress conditions. Varying the network structures, the experimental conditions and comparing the outcomes we were able to delineate a very initial snapshot of behavioral and neural prerequisite for emotional-based actions. On the other hand, we have to stress that the main contribution we brought is setting-up a methodology to support future studies on emotions in natural and artificial agents

What Can Information Encapsulation Tell Us About Emotional Rationality?

What can features of cognitive architecture, e.g. the information encapsulation of certain emotion processing systems, tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa proposes the following hypothesis: “the role of emotions is to supply the insufficiency of reason by imitating the encapsulation of perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Very roughly, emotion processing can sometimes occur in a way that is insensitive to what an agent already knows, and such processing can assist reasoning by restricting the response-options she considers. This paper aims to provide an exposition and assessment of de Sousa’s hypothesis. I argue information encapsulation is not essential to emotion-driven reasoning, as emotions can determine the relevance of response-options even without being encapsulated. However, I argue encapsulation can still play a role in assisting reasoning by restricting response-options more efficiently, and in a way that ensures which options emotions deem relevant are not overridden by what the agent knows. I end by briefly explaining why this very feature also helps explain how emotions can, on occasion, hinder reasoning

A Neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness

A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness revolves around the distinction between the subject and objects of consciousness. In contrast to the mainstream of cognitive science, neuropsychoanalysis prioritises the subject. The subject of consciousness is the indispensable page upon which its objects are inscribed. This has implications for our conception of the mental. The subjective being of consciousness is not registered in the classical exteroceptive modalities; it is not a cognitive representation, not a memory trace. Cognitive representations are ‘mental solids,’ embedded within subjective consciousness, and their tangible and visible (etc.) properties are projected onto reality. It is important to recognise that mental solids (e.g. the body-as-object) are no more real than the subjective being they are represented in (the body-as-subject). Moreover, pure subjectivity is not without content or quality. This aspect of consciousness is conventionally described quantitatively as the level of consciousness, ‘wakefulness’. But it feels like something to be awake. The primary modality of this aspect of consciousness is affect. Some implications of this frame of reference are discussed here, in broad brush strokes. This is an electronic version of an article published as Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, Volume 13, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 173-185. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219635214400032, © World Scientific Publishing Company, http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/jin

Cardioceptive accuracy is associated with arousal but not with valence and perceived exertion under physical load

Under resting conditions, cardioceptive accuracy-the acuity of the perception of heartbeats-is associated with the self-reported intensity of affective states but not with reported valence. Physical exertion elicits positive affect below the anaerobic threshold and negative affect above the threshold while arousal gradually increases. The current research aimed to study the associations between cardioceptive accuracy and characteristics of the affective response (arousal and valence) during physical activity. About 67 undergraduate students completed the Schandry task and rated their perceived exertion (Borg-scale) and affective experience (arousal and valence) under three physical loads (running on a treadmill below, around, and above the anaerobic threshold). Cardioceptive accuracy was associated with the arousal component of the affective states during physical activity but not with valence and perceived exertion

A Robot Model of OC-Spectrum Disorders : Design Framework, Implementation and First Experiments

© 2019 Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyComputational psychiatry is increasingly establishing itself as valuable discipline for understanding human mental disorders. However, robot models and their potential for investigating embodied and contextual aspects of mental health have been, to date, largely unexplored. In this paper, we present an initial robot model of obsessive-compulsive (OC) spectrum disorders based on an embodied motivation-based control architecture for decision making in autonomous robots. The OC family of conditions is chiefly characterized by obsessions (recurrent, invasive thoughts) and/or compulsions (an urge to carry out certain repetitive or ritualized behaviors). The design of our robot model follows and illustrates a general design framework that we have proposed to ground research in robot models of mental disorders, and to link it with existing methodologies in psychiatry, and notably in the design of animal models. To test and validate our model, we present and discuss initial experiments, results and quantitative and qualitative analysis regarding the compulsive and obsessive elements of OC-spectrum disorders. While this initial stage of development only models basic elements of such disorders, our results already shed light on aspects of the underlying theoretical model that are not obvious simply from consideration of the model.Peer reviewe

Negative emotional experiences during navigation enhance parahippocampal activity during recall of place information

It is known that the parahippocampal cortex is involved in object-place associations in spatial learning, but it remains unknown whether activity within this region is modulated by affective signals during navigation. Here we used fMRI to measure the neural consequences of emotional experiences on place memory during navigation. A day before scanning, participants undertook an active object location memory task within a virtual house in which each room was associated with a different schedule of task-irrelevant emotional events. The events varied in valence (positive, negative, or neutral) and in their rate of occurrence (intermittent vs. constant). On a subsequent day, we measured neural activity while participants were shown static images of the previously learned virtual environment, now in the absence of any affective stimuli. Our results showed that parahippocampal activity was significantly enhanced bilaterally when participants viewed images of a room in which they had previously encountered negatively arousing events. We conclude that such automatic enhancement of place representations by aversive emotional events serves as an important adaptive mechanism for avoiding future threats

Affective iconic words benefit from additional sound–meaning integration in the left amygdala

Recent studies have shown that a similarity between sound and meaning of a word (i.e., iconicity) can help more readily access the meaning of that word, but the neural mechanisms underlying this beneficial role of iconicity in semantic processing remain largely unknown. In an fMRI study, we focused on the affective domain and examined whether affective iconic words (e.g., high arousal in both sound and meaning) activate additional brain regions that integrate emotional information from different domains (i.e., sound and meaning). In line with our hypothesis, affective iconic words, compared to their non‐iconic counterparts, elicited additional BOLD responses in the left amygdala known for its role in multimodal representation of emotions. Functional connectivity analyses revealed that the observed amygdalar activity was modulated by an interaction of iconic condition and activations in two hubs representative for processing sound (left superior temporal gyrus) and meaning (left inferior frontal gyrus) of words. These results provide a neural explanation for the facilitative role of iconicity in language processing and indicate that language users are sensitive to the interaction between sound and meaning aspect of words, suggesting the existence of iconicity as a general property of human language